You must either save a group of m people or a group of n people. If there are no morally relevant diff erences among the people, which group should you save? Th is problem is known as the number problem. Th e recent discussion has focussed on three proposals: (i) Save the greatest number of people, (ii) Toss a fair coin, or (iii) Set up a weighted lottery, in which the probability of saving m people is m / m + n , and the probability of saving n people is n / m + n . Th is contribution examines a fourth alternative, the mixed solution, according to which both fairness and the total number of people saved count. It is shown that the mixed solution can be defended without assuming the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of value.
Introduction
Suppose you face a choice between two alternatives. You must either save two people and let one person die, or let two people die and save one. Th ere are no morally relevant diff erences among the people. What should you do? Th is example has been discussed extensively in the literature in recent years and is commonly referred to as the number problem . 1 Unsurprisingly, several views have been proposed. Utilitarians maintain that one should always save the greatest number, because this would bring about the greatest amount of wellbeing. However, as famously objected to by Taurek and others, the utilitarian solution seems to be unfair. 2 Imagine, for instance, that two cruise ships have struck two separate icebergs and are sinking rapidly. Now, the captain of a nearby rescue boat has to decide which ship to assist. Th e rescue boat can only assist one of the two ships. Th e mere fact that there are more people aboard one of the ships is not suffi cient reason for totally ignoring those aboard the other ship. Each person should be granted some possibility of being rescued; all of us have morally signifi cant interests that ought to be given at least some weight. In order to account for this intuition, it has been suggested that the decision should be taken by tossing a fair coin.
3 Such a lottery would give each individual an equal chance of being rescued. If fairness is all that matters, then this proposal certainly makes sense.
However, according to some authors, a lottery in which each individual has an equal chance of being rescued is unjustifi ed in many cases, e.g. in a choice between saving either a million people or ten people. 4 A fi fty percent risk of not saving a million people is simply morally unacceptable. In response to this objection, Broome has proposed that the number problem could be resolved by setting up a weighted lottery, in which the probability that the fi rst group (of m people) is saved is m / m + n , and the probability that the second group (of n people) is saved is n / m + n .
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Th at said, arranging a lottery seems to be entirely out of the question in a choice between saving a million or ten people, no matter the probabilities. In such an extreme situation, it can be argued that the positive moral value gained by arranging a lottery is entirely outweighed by the number of people saved when saving the greatest number. Th e present article aims at exploring this claim further. Th e hypothesis is that arranging a lottery contributes towards making an act fairer, while other features, such as non-optimal consequences, contribute towards making the act worse in other morally relevant respects. Doing the right thing ultimately amounts to balancing diff erent values against each other. In what follows, this view will be referred to as the mixed solution .
Th e mixed solution has been briefl y touched upon by John Broome and Iwao Hirose, but it has never been extensively researched. 6 Contrary to Broome and Hirose, I argue that the mixed solution can be defended without assuming 2 In addition to the references given in the fi rst footnote, see also the possibility of interpersonal value comparisons. Th at is, the mixed solution can be accepted without claiming that one ought to save two lives rather than one because two counts for more than one. Th is might look like a rather technical and modest point, but closer examination reveals that it is not. A prominent reason for taking the number problem seriously is the widespread belief that moral value cannot be aggregated across diff erent people, not even in principle. Anyone wishing to 'combine' the claims of diff erent people into a unifi ed, stronger moral claim has to explain how this can be done in a non-arbitrary way. We are all individuals, and this fact is surely of some moral importance. Before proceeding, an important restriction has to be introduced. In what follows, the mixed solution will only be analysed from the consequentialist's point of view. Other kinds of positions, based on notions such as rights, virtues and fair contracts, will not be touched upon.
7 Th is is because the consequentialist's ethical framework is the only one in which the concept of aggregation plays a prominent role. Even though e.g. the advocate of a rights-based theory could claim that it is worse to violate two rights rather than one, it is generally agreed that he or she is in no way committed to this view. Th e violation of the rights of one person might be equally as bad as, or even incomparable to, the violation of the rights of two people. However, nearly all consequentialists believe that consequences can somehow be aggregated interpersonally, so articulating a view not relying on that assumption seems to be worthwhile.
Th e structure of this contribution is as follows. In section 2, the utilitarian solution to the number problem is scrutinized in more detail, as is a defence for a similar view put forward by Hirose. In section 3, an account of the mixed solution proposed by Hirose is analysed and criticized. Th ereafter, in section 4, I develop my own account of the mixed solution, and explain why it is more attractive than previous versions.
Utilitarianism and Beyond
Is there anything wrong with utilitarianism? As pointed out above, utilitarianism provides an easy solution to the number problem. Full-fl edged utilitarians could simply point out that one should save the greatest number of people, because that will typically produce the greatest amount of wellbeing. However, as briefl y indicated above, utilitarianism fails to acknowledge the importance of fairness. Utilitarians assign no moral importance what so ever to fairness, and this contradicts our considered moral intuitions. Of course, some utilitarians might response to this argument by 'biting the bullet' and saying that fairness is a morally irrelevant concept. However, let us for the sake of the argument assume that there is something wrong with the utilitarian analysis, in order to fi nd out what we might learn from the number problem.
Needless to say, it should be acknowledged that even if one fi nds utilitarianism unacceptable, it does not follow that it would be wrong to save the greatest number, i.e. that the Greatest Number view is false. Hirose proposes a more sophisticated, non-utilitarian defence of the Greatest Number view. His main point is that non-utilitarian 'consequentialists can justify the case for saving the greater number without combining the goods of separate people ', 8 that is, without carrying out any kind of interpersonal aggregation of moral value.
Briefl y put, Hirose attempts to show that the following two principles, both of which are weaker than the utilitarian view, support the Greatest Number view.
Symmetry: Two alternatives are equally good if they diff er only with regard to the identities of the people.
Pareto: If one state of aff airs is better for some persons than another state, and if it is worse for no persons, then it is better than the other.
Symmetry is a criterion of impartiality, which is accepted by most (but not all) consequentialists. Th e Pareto condition has been imported from economics. It is, of course, a substantial ethical principle. Most notably, the Pareto condition is inconsistent with most principles of equality, because if one improves the situation for one person while leaving it unchanged for all others, this change will lead to increased inequality. Arguably, this should be a matter of concern for most people. However, note that neither Symmetry nor Pareto presupposes any kind of interpersonal aggregation of goods. 8 Hirose, 'Aggregation and Numbers', p. 68.
A B C
Alternative 1: (saved, dead, dead) Alternative 2:
(dead, saved, dead) Alternative 3:
(dead, saved, saved) Table 1 In order to see how Hirose applies Symmetry and Pareto for justifying the Greatest Number view, consider a choice among the alternatives listed in Table 1 . If Alternative 1 is chosen, person A will be saved, but not B and C, and so on. Now, Symmetry implies that Alternatives 1 and 2 are equally good, and Pareto implies that Alternative 3 is better than Alternative 2. Th erefore, given that the relation 'better than' is transitive, it follows that Alternative 3 is better than Alternative 1, i.e., we should save the greatest number. 9 Unfortunately, Hirose's argument only works as long as all alternatives are non-probabilistic. Even though it is true that Alternative 3 is indeed better than Alternative 1, nothing more can be concluded. In particular, it does not follow that Alternative 3 is better than any of the two major alternative positions in the debate over the number problem, the Equal-Chances view and the Proportional-Chances view, mentioned in section 1. By letting (50% saved; 50% (saved, saved)) denote a lottery in which the probability is 50% that the fi rst individual is saved and 50% that the two others are saved, the Equal-Chances view and the Proportional-Chances view can be described as in Table 2 .
Evidently, Hirose's two principles, Symmetry and Pareto, are not suffi cient for deciding which alternative to choose. Since Pareto is only applicable to deterministic cases, it cannot be used for adjudicating among probabilistic alternatives. Th erefore, Hirose's argument fails to show that the Greatest Number view (Alternative 3 above) is morally better than the Equal-Chances view and the Proportional-Chances view. Consequently, since the latter views are among the most well-established ones in the literature, the reasoning suggested by Hirose is not suffi cient for giving a comprehensive analysis of the number problem. It is simply not true that Symmetry and Pareto imply that 'consequentialists can justify the case for saving the greater number without combining the goods of separate people'. Th e Proportional-Chances view: (33% saved; 66% (saved, saved)) 
Th e Mixed Solution
Consider two very diff erent instances of the number problem. Firstly, suppose that you could save either one or two people. Secondly, suppose that you could save either a group of 1000 people, or a group of 1001 people. Some authors have claimed that these two examples ought to be treated diff erently.
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In the latter example, fairness seems to outweigh the opportunity to save one extra person; therefore, the decision ought to be made by tossing a fair coin. However, when facing a choice between saving either one or two people, the opportunity to save one extra person is more important than fairness, since only one person will be treated unfairly. Hence, in that case, one ought to save two people for sure, instead of arranging a lottery. Th is is the mixed solution.
It simultaneously takes into account two apparently confl icting considerations, viz. fairness and the number of people saved. According to Hirose, an unfair distribution of chances is morally bad, and this badness can be aggregated interpersonally. 12 In the choice between saving 1000 or 1001 people, coin-tossing amounts to saving an expected number of 1000.5 lives, whereas if one decides to save the greatest number, 1001 people will be saved. However, each of the 1000 people not saved will suff er from some unfairness u . Th e total amount of unfairness created by saving the greatest number of people is u × 1000. See Table 3 .
For present purposes, it is helpful to assume that moral value is additive. Th is means that in Table 3 , tossing a fair coin is morally better than saving the greatest number, unless u is very close to 0. Th is is because 1000.5 + 0 > 1001 -u × 1,000, for every suffi ciently large u . For the sake of the argument, we assume that u is in fact suffi ciently large, i.e., that one ought indeed to toss a fair coin rather than saving the greatest number in the choice between saving 1001 or 1000 people.
Th e point of this example is that the analogous conclusion does not hold true when choosing between saving one or two people; see u is of the same magnitude as before, it follows that it is better to save the greatest number in this case, instead of tossing a fair coin. Fundamentally, this is because there is only one person who is treated unfairly, whereas the diff erence in the number of people saved is the same as in the previous example, i.e., on average 0.5 extra persons.
Note that the present line of thought, which I take to be a reasonable explication of Hirose's view, relies heavily on a certain non-trivial assumption. Th e assumption in question is that there is a larger 'total amount' of unfairness in the fi rst example ( Table 3 ) as compared to the second ( Table 4 ) . Is this a plausible assumption? Well, it seems obvious that more people will in fact be deprived of the chance of being saved if the Greatest Number view is adopted in the example illustrated in Table 3 , as compared to the example illustrated in Table 4 . However, it is not obvious that this is in itself a morally relevant fact. Consider a choice between saving either 1000 people or 2000 people. Compare this with a choice between saving either one or two people. It is not obvious that the total aggregated 'amount' of unfairness produced by saving the greatest number in these two examples diff ers. For each person who is 'left behind', there are two others who are saved; the proportions are the same. Hence, it is not evident that Hirose is right when he claims that, 'Th e bad of unfairness, done to each person, is constant, regardless of the number of people concerned'. 13 Arguably, advocates of the mixed solution need a more precise account of unfairness. Isabel Burnham has proposed such an account.
14 Briefl y put, her proposal is that unfairness should be measured by applying the Gini-index to each individual's chances of being saved. Th e Gini-index assigns a number between 0 (perfect equality) and one (perfect inequality) to every distribution of numbers. (Usually, these numbers measure each individual's income or wellbeing, but in the present context, it is reasonable to suppose that they 13 Hirose, 'Aggregation and Numbers', p. 77. refl ect each person's probability of being saved.) Th e formula for calculating the Gini-index is complex. 15 However, in order to visualize the Gini-index graphically, suppose that all persons are ordered along a horizontal axis according to their probability of being saved, from the worst-off to the bestoff . Th e Lorenz curve is then the cumulative sum of numbers obtained by adding the fi rst person's probability of being saved to that of the next person, etc. Let these cumulative numbers be represented on the vertical axis. For example, if everyone enjoys equal chances of being saved, the Lorenz curve is a diagonal line going from the lower left corner to the upper right one, and if a single person will be saved with probability one and all others left behind, the Lorenz curve is a straight horizontal line that turns up at the right end of the vertical axis. Th e Gini-index corresponds to the area trapped by the hypothetical straight line denoting perfect equality and the actual Lorenz curve for the distribution of probabilities, divided by the area of the entire triangle. Let us assume that this is a plausible way of measuring degrees of fairness. Now, it can be easily checked (and intuitively visualized) that it is, in fact more fair to save two and let one die, compared to saving 1001 and letting 1000 people die. Th is means that the value of u is not, contrary to what Hirose assumes, the same in the examples illustrated in Tables 3 and 4 . Th e value of u , i.e., the amount of individual unfairness, varies from case to case. Th e correct value is obtained by calculating the Gini-index for each distribution of probabilities.
However, Hirose may nevertheless be right that the aggregated amount of unfairness, if such an entity exists, is higher when 1000 people are left behind, compared to the case in which only one person is left behind, because it may very well hold true that u 1 × 1,000 > u 2 × 1. I shall refrain from discussing whether or not this is the case. My point is simply that Hirose's analysis relies on an assumption that Burnham has shown to be doubtful: a single, fi xed value of u cannot be used for analysing cases involving very diff erent numbers of people. John Broome's view is to a large extent similar to Hirose's. Broome argues that, 'fairness is not everything. Fairness requires tossing a coin, but just as I think the fairness of saving no one is outweighed by the badness of the result, so I think the fairness of tossing a coin is outweighed by the expected badness 15 Let p be a vector consisting of each person's probability of being saved, and let p -be the average probability in p. Th e Gini-index G(p) is then defi ned as follows:
of the result'.
16 I take this to mean that Broome also accepts that unfairness can be aggregated into a whole. Or, put slightly diff erently, that Broome agrees that it makes sense to multiply u by 1000 when a thousand people are left behind, and so on and so forth.
Th at said, the idea that fairness can be aggregated into a whole is presumably a bit questionable. How can there be such a thing as an aggregated amount of unfairness? Why should we believe that unfairness can be aggregated interpersonally, i.e. that it makes sense to say that persons A and B together are treated more or less unfairly than a single person C? Arguably, the available evidence about fairness, which mainly consists of vague moral intuitions, only supports the idea that a single person can be treated more or less unfairly in relation to other possible ways of treating that particular person. To say that person A and B are facing more unfairness than C is a question-begging claim; anyone wishing to make that claim fi rst has to tell us more about the concept of fairness. Of course, a mere reference to the Gini-concept would not do in the present context. Firstly, it is far from clear that it makes sense (in a substantial way, not just in a mere technical way) to compare the Gini-index for populations of diff erent sizes. Secondly, a more fundamental problem is whether there is any reasonable way at all in which fairness can be interpersonally measured. Th e Gini-formula in itself does not answer that question. It is a mere mathematical abstraction, which may or may not correspond to a phenomenon in the world.
Surely, if 1000 people are treated unfairly, that is morally worse than if one person is treated unfairly, all else being equal. However, this conclusion does not presuppose that there exists some collective, interpersonal entity corresponding to an aggregated amount of unfairness. It is suffi cient to point out that 1000 people are being treated badly; the reason need not be that the Gini-index of the corresponding distribution of probabilities is morally unfavourable.
An Alternative Account of the Mixed Solution
Th is section proposes an alternative account of the mixed solution, which avoids at least two of the problems associated with the Broome-Hirose analysis. Firstly, the new account does not assume that unfairness can be aggregated interpersonally. As argued above, there is no reason to believe that there is such thing as an accumulated sum of unfairness for each group of people treated badly. Secondly, the new account does not assume that moral value can be compared interpersonally; this point is analogous to the fi rst one.
Th e main feature of the new account is that fairness is construed as a moral value that is good for the individual . Th ere are no collective moral values. All moral values, including fairness, can at most be aggregated on a personal level. Consider the following, general formulation of this idea:
Individualism: All moral values, including fairness, are individual values which cannot be interpersonally aggregated.
Th is principle is best explained by way of analogy: Suppose that it would be unfair to use illegal steroids while participating in the Olympic Games. Th en, the more 'clean' athletes who face unfair competition, the worse it would be from a moral point of view. However, according to Individualism, unfairness is something that aff ects the individual only. Th ere is no such thing as an aggregated amount of unfairness materialized in the Olympic Games. Th e badness resulting from unfair competition is something that makes each individual worse off that he or she would have been otherwise. Th e claim that it is worse from a moral point of view if a large number of people are aff ected is just a claim about the ranking of alternative acts . It is not a claim about some 'amount' of aggregated unfairness in the world.
Further to this point, even a winner who has benefi ted from illegal steroids would be worse off than he or she would have been otherwise. All things being equal, it is better to win in the Olympics without using illegal steroids, because that would be a fair victory. Furthermore, all things being equal, it is better to be defeated in the Olympics in a fair competition than in an unfair one. However, nothing could be said about whether the winner suff ers more or less unfairness than a group of other athletes do together. Such claims would invariably require interpersonal aggregation of individual moral values.
Hirose defi nes the concept of aggregation as follows: 17 a vector of normatively relevant features ( a 1 , a 2 , … , a i ) is at least as
where f ( ) is a strictly increasing function that is not bound above. Suppose that F is fairness. Th en, the principle of Individualism should be taken to mean that there is no function f ( ) that orders diff erent distributions according to degrees of fairness. However, it might still be possible to rank the set of vectors according to some other feature F ' , such as choice-worthiness.
Individualism is a moral principle on the same level of abstraction as the two principles suggested by Hirose, i.e. Symmetry and Pareto. Th is means that all three principles are fundamental moral principles, from which everyday moral rules are to be derived. Taken together, these principles can explain the moral diff erence between the choice of saving 1000 or 1001 people, respectively the choice of saving either one or two people. First consider the choice between saving 1000 people or 1001. In Table 5 , one could either save a group, A, of 1000 people, or another group B of 1001 people. By applying Symmetry and Pareto to the latter alternative, it follows that this alternative is morally better than saving the smaller group A. However, the third alternative, tossing a fair coin, will be morally better than the second alternative in case u > 0.5. Let us, for the sake of the argument, suppose that this condition is fulfi lled. It then follows that tossing a fair coin is the morally right thing to do in the choice between saving A or B. Note that this conclusion has been reached without assuming that moral values, such as fairness or utility, can be interpersonally aggregated.
Now consider the choice between saving either one or two people; see Table 6 . Since each person treated unfairly in this example faces less unfairness than in the previous example, it may safely be assumed that u' < 0.5. In this example, the moral principles considered so far are insuffi cient for deciding what to do. Th is is because no alternative is Pareto-better than the others. All that can be concluded is that saving two people is morally better than saving one. In order to conclude that saving two is better than tossing a coin, one has to assume that u is low and that moral values are not individual, i.e., that they can be aggregated interpersonally by, e.g., adding each individual's value to that of others. As argued above, this is a questionable assumption. Before one decides whether to save one, or two, or to toss a fair coin, some additional moral assumptions are required.
However, there is an easy way out of this predicament. Th e key idea is to make a sharp distinction between evaluative and normative claims. In Table 6 , each number represents each individual's moral value under diff erent alternative acts. Th e numbers can thus be seen as a summary of a set of evaluative statements. Th is set of evaluative statements is, of course, consistent with several diff erent normative (action-guiding) principles. For instance, it could be argued that if an alternative is not Pareto-better than a set of other alternatives, then all those alternatives are morally permissible. In the example illustrated in Table 4 , this 'liberal' normative principle would imply that saving two people and tossing a fair coin are permissible alternatives, whereas saving one person is not. Th at is, an act is morally permissible as long as it is not defeated by another act, in terms of Pareto-betterness. Typically, this means that a rather large subset of a set of alternative acts will be morally permissible.
To sum up, the main argument of this article looks as simple as it can reasonably be. Both fairness and the total number of people saved matter, but neither value can be aggregated interpersonally. Th erefore, the liberal normative principle outlined here ought to be adopted when facing the number problem. Save one 0 -u' 0 -u' 1 -u' Save two 1-u' 1 -u' 0 -u' Toss a coin 0.5 0.5 0.5
